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To reflect on the future of the euro area and monetary unions more generally, it is useful to return to two well-known, but key 
observations about the causes of the euro area crisis.
Dual debt and competitiveness crisis
Short of an integrated global economic strategy, 
the euro area countries have not grown in tandem. 
Having failed or just not tried to implement reforms 
(labor market, pensions, pro-competition policies, 
tax collection infrastructure…) and having let wages 
increase much faster than productivity, Southern 
European countries have seen their competitiveness 
substantially reduced over the last decade. While 
the euro area is roughly in external balance, GIIPS 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
lost 20-30% competitiveness relative to Germany over 
the last decade.1 As much trade is intra-European, 
substantial current account imbalances in Southern 
European countries emerged, leading to a concern 
about the sustainability of their debt.
Options are few. A nominal devaluation (high infl ation 
and devaluation), the standard way for countries to 
restore competitiveness and avoid “default” (or at least 
formal default, as infl ation is a form of expropriation) 
when over-indebted, is ruled out in a monetary union.2 
A competitive disinfl ation, with a substantial reduction 
of prices and wages, would require much coordination 
within each country and is rather unlikely to happen 
in Southern Europe. Finally, a fiscal devaluation 
(for instance in the form of an increase in VAT and 
a decrease in payroll taxes) would require a drastic 
increase in taxation in countries that are often already 
prone to fi scal evasion.3
At the same time, it would be hard for a country to 
abandon the euro; in the short run, this move would 
trigger an immediate run on banks;4 furthermore, 
the state might have trouble paying pensions and 
salaries even if it defaulted. In the longer term, the 
country would forego the benefi ts of being pooled 
with countries perceived as more trustworthy.
Weak european institutions
The European Treaty’s Excessive Defi cit Procedure 
put the European Commission (with a needed 
backing from Commissioners) in charge of monitoring 
country compliance with the ceilings of 3% for the 
budget defi cit and of 60% for public debt. The real 
power however lies with the EcoFin Council, which 
decides whether a defi cit is indeed excessive.5 The 
EcoFin Council does not exert suffi cient pressure. 
In contrast with, say, the IMF, the EcoFin council is 
too political, and therefore judge and party. As an 
outcome, no sanction has ever been applied.6
The political bias toward laissez-faire is understandable. 
First, there is little for a country to gain by insisting 
on imposing discipline on another country that 
does not comply with common rules; the former is 
unlikely to be pivotal in the 17-member euro area 
decision-making process while it can get into the 
latter country’s bad books by taking an adversarial 
stance. Second, political benefi ts may dominate 
reputational concerns; a case in point is Europe’s 
deliberate ignorance of Greece’s and Italy’s accounting 
gimmicks (well-documented by Eurostat and others) 
in order to allow these countries to join the euro area. 
Third, enforcers may feel that they will be granted a 
similar favor when their turn comes. Interestingly, 
France and Germany themselves violated the rules 
in 2003. Thus, free riding, political agendas and 
quid pro quos all concur to make sanctions an empty 
threat.
Ex post sanctions require not only courage, but 
also some thinking. Financial sanctions often are 
inappropriate, as they increase fi nancial pressure at a 
time at which the country is already in fi nancial straits.7 
1 A prescient view on the likely consequences of this evolution (fi nally published as Blanchard 2007) was Olivier Blanchard’s analysis of the Portuguese case.
2 This “smoother default” is one of the reasons why the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, which also have fragile public fi nances, currently have an 
easier time refi nancing than distressed European countries.
3 See Farhi et al. (2011) for a general result on the feasibility of fi scal devaluations.
4 Introducing a new currency takes time and cannot be achieved overnight. Optimally the decision needs to be secret and a banking holiday be declared.
5 Very recently, though, the Commission regained a bit more power through the new EU governance measures (the so-called «Six Pack»).
6 There have been so far 97 violations (year/country) of the 3% rule, including 68 outright violations (29 corresponded to allowed violations linked to a recession).
7 The Stability and Growth Pact specifi es a fi ne of 0.2% of GDP for each year, but the fi rst, in which the defi cit exceeds 3%; fi nancial sanctions have been extended 
to encompass debt level violations as well under the third version of the Stability and Growth Pact.
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In this spirit, De Grauwe (2011a) criticises the ESFS 
penalty rate lending policy.8,9 One can understand 
the willingness to discourage excessive borrowing in 
the fi rst place. However, just like (never enforced) 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) sanctions aggravate 
defi cits at a time distressed countries have diffi culties 
controlling them, so do high interest rates on loans.
This diffi culty of imposing monetary sanctions is 
familiar from the prudential regulation realm as 
well, as troubled banks are not asked to pay fair-value 
deposit insurance or exorbitant rates at the discount 
window; it is understood that high deposit insurance 
or interest rates would compound the banks’ solvency 
problem rather than solve it. Instead, troubled banks 
optimally see their discretion reduced and their 
balance sheet downsized; a case in point is the 1991 
FDIC Improvement Act in the United States, which 
specifi es reduced degrees of operating freedom as 
the banks become less capitalised. 
Similarly, and as is indeed standard practice for 
IMF programmes (as well of the “Troika – EC, ECB 
and IMF –” programs in Europe), troubled countries 
should see their sovereignty reduced rather than 
face monetary sanctions: their budget should be 
carefully monitored and structural reforms promoting 
competitiveness required, while protecting the 
poorest inhabitants. Needless to say, such interference 
is politically diffi cult and often successfully resisted, 
except when the country is about to fall off the cliff 
and accepts IMF-type conditionality.
European institutions also have had a bad record in 
the current crisis. Leaving aside attempts at shifting 
the blame (blaming rating agencies and speculators, 
which does not enhance investor confidence), 
lenient stress tests for banks (for example, Dexia 
was deemed solvent just before it defaulted),10 
and a loss of credibility stemming from some 
confusing announcements proclaiming an infl exible 
determination to honor fully sovereign commitments 
and ruling out private sector involvement prior to 
Greece’s default11 on July 21, 2011, two recurrent 
problems are worth discussing:12
BUYING TIME
Larry Summers13 reminds us of Daniel Ellsberg’ use of 
Pentagon Papers to document the US administration 
indecisive approach during the Vietnam War “At 
every juncture [policymakers] made the minimum 
commitments necessary to avoid imminent disaster 
– offering optimistic rhetoric, but never taking the 
steps that even they believed could offer the prospect 
of decisive victory. They were tragically caught in a 
kind of no-man’s-land – unable to reverse a course to 
which they had committed so much, but also unable to 
generate the political will to take forward steps that gave 
any realistic prospect of success.” and aptly points at 
the similarity with European decision-making with 
regards to the Euro crisis. The December 9, 2011 
meeting was the 15th in the last 22 months. All – at 
least in their resulting decisions – have been mainly 
preoccupied by the short-run goal of avoiding an 
imminent collapse. As we will discuss later, though, 
some headway was made at that meeting.
ALLOCATING RISK IN AN AMBIGUOUS MANNER
 Another area where European policymakers have 
been indecisive concerns who will foot the bill in 
case of sovereign default. Should the offi cial sector 
cover the losses or rather impose private sector 
involvement (PSI)?
The perceived or implicit promise until Greece 
defaulted on July 21, 2011 was the absence of default, 
8 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created in 2010, and will become a permanent rescue fund in July 2012 (the European Stability Mechanism). 
Its remit is to provide loans to euro area countries in trouble.
9 Ireland borrowed from the EFSF at almost 6% for example; its risk premium was scaled back at the July 21, 2011 summit. The future ESM will lend at 2% above 
its funding rate.
10 Stress tests were published by the European Banking Authority in July 2011 for 91 European banks. 8 fl anked and 16 were warned to be insuffi ciently capitalised. 
Dexia, which went bust early October, was in the healthy group. 
11 Technically Greece is not “in default”, as default is defi ned as a lack of repayment. The European Union twisted the arms of European banks to “voluntarily” 
forego some of the value of their assets. 
12 Another institutional handicap of European institutions is the speed of reaction. For example the July deal took 3 months to ratify. In the meanwhile the ECB 
had to fi ll the gap. To be certain, ECB had already become a fi scal authority anyway. It had become a lender of last resort by substantially expanding the size of 
its balance sheet in the last few years (through its EUR 180 billion securities market programme), and this expansion had accelerated in the recent months. Since 
then, on December 8, 2011, the ECB announced measures to support bank lending and money market activity; in particular it decided to conduct refi nancing 
operations (LTROs) with a maturity of 36 months and the option of early repayment after one year. On December 21, 2011, euro area banks rushed to take out 
the corresponding low (1%) interest rate, three-year loans and borrowed 489 billion euros. At the time, it was unclear whether banks would use this money to 
buy sovereign debt (as was suggested by France) or just use it to boost their balance sheets. But so far, ECB interventions have not led to infl ationary pressures.
13 Summers’ op-ed was published in the September 18, 2011 Financial Times.
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as Europe was widely expected to bail out troubled 
countries; in effect, until last July Europe was ruled 
by an implicit full joint-and-several liability. The 
preservation of the sovereign risk-free regulatory tag 
by prudential supervisors further reinforced fi nancial 
institutions’ belief that euro area countries’ sovereign 
debt was perfectly safe. Greece’s default, like Lehman’s 
in 2008, was the wake-up call that the widespread 
perception of full guarantees may have been erroneous 
after all. PSI still is an object of intense debate.
Who foots the bill is not solely a redistributive matter 
between public and private sector. First, ambiguity 
creates large gambling opportunities. Spreads of 
6 or 10% create substantial gain opportunities if 
PSI is indeed excluded ex post, while country risk 
exposes fi nancial intermediaries to large losses if 
policymakers instead opt for PSI. This creates a 
large-scale conundrum for banking regulators in 
their determination of the risk weights to be applied 
to bank holdings of sovereign bonds. In particular 
the zero or low risk weights currently applied may 
encourage banks in trouble to use risky sovereign 
bond investments to gamble for resurrection. 
Second, the discussions on who should bear the 
burden of sovereign default are unstructured. They 
mention valid arguments but generally lack the 
“big picture”. Arguments include the “ex post view” 
that private sector involvement makes it diffi cult 
for a troubled country to roll over its debt in the 
marketplace; and the “ex ante view” according to 
which ex post solidarity among countries to bail out 
each other when distressed creates moral hazard. 
Section 3 will develop a couple of frameworks that bear 
on the allocation of country risk between the market and 
the international community. Economics teaches us 
that the key driver of an optimal allocation of risk 
should be the incentives it creates. The most familiar 
theory in this respect is the monitoring theory: who 
foots the bill also determines who monitors. Regardless 
of one’s view as to who (international community, 
market) is a better monitor, one will agree that the 
recent no-man’s land has proved rather unsatisfactory: 
governments have imposed no discipline on each other 
and markets have long thought that their lending to 
weak sovereigns would go unpunished. Put differently, 
no-one felt accountable.
1| A BROADER REMIT 
FOR THE STABILITY PACT?
It has long been understood that Europe, with its 
limited labor mobility and its quasi-absence of an 
automatic redistribution mechanism (a federal 
budget), is not an optimal monetary zone. Even 
though one should not take institutions as cast in 
stone,14 it seems unlikely that fi scal federalism will 
come about, as it would presumably involve large 
and predictable transfers across countries. 
Short of fi scal federalism, European countries will 
still have to accept a substantial loss of sovereignty 
if they are to continue living together. Fortunately, 
there is still some scope for making institutions more 
compatible with the existence of a monetary union. 
Two reforms come to mind:
1|1  Regulating the banking sector 
at european level 
Financial regulation by and large still operates 
according to the country-of-origin rule: national 
regulators supervise the financial institutions 
chartered in their country. There are at least 
two rationales for centralising prudential regulation 
at the European level and creating an independent 
supervisory authority. First, it is unlikely that all 
27 fi nancial regulation authorities in Europe (17 in 
the euro area) are suffi ciently well-staffed to match 
the sophistication of private banks. 
Second and more to the point for the focus of this 
paper, there is growing awareness that private debt is 
now public debt; the banking fragility following the 
construction booms in Ireland and Spain is a case 
in point; Ireland and Spain did not have extravagant 
public defi cits and debts to start with. But banking 
bailouts threatened to take a heavy toll on public 
fi nances. More generally, many exchange rates and 
sovereign debt crises start with a credit expansion and 
a real estate bubble that authorities treat leniently.15
Europe does have supranational fi nancial authorities 
such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
14 Taking US history as a precedent, then the fi rst step was balanced budget amendments (“golden rules”) introduced in the 19th century. The growth of the 
Federal Government came much later.
15 See Reinhart-Rogoff (2009).
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and the European Banking Authority (EBA). But these 
do not have the prerogatives of ordinary regulators. 
For example the ESRB can go and see national 
regulators and suggest some change of course. It can 
ask the domestic regulator to “comply or explain”; 
while the threat of embarrassment always has some 
impact, there is only so much that can be expected 
from such an approach; for, to make it public that the 
national regulator is putting the domestic fi nancial 
sector at risk, the ESRB must voice concerns about 
the country’s fi nancial sector and thereby run the 
risk of unsettling markets and triggering a run on the 
country. For good reasons, crying wolf is not part of 
central bankers’ culture.
1|2 Fiscal rules and independent 
fi scal policy councils16
There has been much discussion lately about using 
golden rules specifying a (cyclically adjusted) target 
for the budget defi cit.17 As with all constraining 
rules, they are resisted for two reasons: the reduced 
freedom left to those whom they constrain, and the 
need for the population to come to terms with the 
notion that those who govern are not necessarily to 
be trusted and just like everybody else react to the 
incentives that there are confronted with.18
DESIGN ISSUES
Golden rules raise complex design and enforcement 
issues and are no panacea.19 These diffi culties are not a 
fundamental fl aw and golden rules should be strongly 
endorsed. In this respect, the December 9, 2011 
summit’s project20 is encouraging, as it calls for a 
binding golden rule (specifying a maximum primary 
defi cit – i.e. gross of debt service – below 0.50% over 
the cycle),21 automatic sanctions (reverse qualifi ed 
majority voting),22 and enforcement by the European 
Court of Justice. 
Designing good fi scal rule features, such as for example 
cyclical adjustments principles, is not straightforward. 
Furthermore, capturing debt sustainability through a 
single cap requires converting contingent liabilities 
and revenues into current recommendations. In 
theory, investments that will improve tax revenue 
or the current account in the future should not be 
treated as current consumptions and therefore not 
be subject to cash accounting (which fully charges 
investments to the budget).23 
The issue is mainly a practical one of where to draw 
the line, as most public policies can always claim 
the existence of some benefi t down the road; in 
practice, this is doable primarily for investments 
that produce tangible revenues, although one can 
rapidly grasp the diffi culties involved in defi ning 
revenues: a one-shot compensation to owners of 
taxi medallions against a (credible) introduction of 
competition reducing taxis fares by half is obviously 
an investment, although it creates no revenue for 
the government. Investments in higher education or 
in creating effi cient labor markets generate similar 
accounting diffi culties. Or to take a topical example, 
the recapitalisation of a bank through public capital, 
fi nanced by public debt, raises the question of which 
part is an investment (restructuring) and which part 
is “consumption” (political benefi ts or capture).24
Likewise, a number of policies transform contingent 
assets or liabilities into cash (privatisation, tax 
amnesties against one-shot payment, public-private 
partnerships25…) or the reverse (lending to 
corporations or countries in trouble). Even traded 
assets (say, gold, oil or gas reserves) raise accounting 
16 For description of the institutions and performance of existing fi scal councils, see e.g. Debrun-Takahashi (2011), von Hagen (2010) and Wren-Lewis (2011).
17 Traditionally, a golden rule refers to the constraint that current taxes cover current expenditures (borrowing being allowed for long-term investments), but we will 
use the term more broadly to describe rules that constrain budget defi cits and borrowing.
18 For a discussion of how the electorate’s motivated beliefs shape public policy, see Bénabou-Tirole (2011).
19 For this reason, it is often proposed to err on the conservative side, by requiring that fi scal adjustments take the form of a surplus reserve fund that can be tapped 
into in a recession, but no defi cit ever.
20 On January 29, 2012, 25 of the European Union’s 27 countries signed up to the treaty enshrining the tougher fi scal rules (the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic 
did not sign).
21 This golden rule is largely inspired by the German one, which among other things prescribes (from 2016 on) a maximum defi cit of 0.35% of GDP in the absence 
of output gap, is cyclically adjusted (except for the possibility of a natural disaster), mandates the use of external measurements and intertemporal recordkeeping. 
The German golden rule also gives a prominent role to the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe in enforcing the rule.
22 The adoption of a reverse majority rule has been recommended many times earlier, including in the van Rompuy report in 2010.
23 The UK government reports public net borrowing. Since 1997, it is in principle obliged to borrow only to fi nance capital (over the cycle). In this spirit, Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2003) have proposed that the budget be balanced for operational purposes and that debt be employed solely to fi nance public investments.
24 These behaviours do not exhaust possible government behaviours in bank bailouts: see Hertig (2012) for taxonomy and an empirical analysis.
25 See Maskin-Tirole (2008) for references on accounting issues in public-private partnerships and for an attempt at modeling the relevant trade-offs in an environment 
in which politicians may try to funnel hidden future rents to contractors or pander to special interests.
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issues, such as fair value versus historical cost or the 
choice of a depreciation rate for investments, which 
are familiar in private sector accounting.
Defi ned benefi t pensions loom particularly large in 
the mis-measurement of public debt. They usually are 
off-balance-sheet and thus not treated as public debt 
on the ground that they are only contingent liabilities. 
To be sure, and as we observe now in some southern 
European countries, pensions can be reduced; the 
scope for adjustment remains rather limited, though. 
In the United States, the main loophole seems to have 
been state pension commitments; unfunded liabilities 
(USD 3.23 trillion out of a total of USD 5.17 trillion 
pension liabilities of the 50 states) are not counted as 
debt. Total state debt with pension liabilities included 
is actually almost 4.5 times the value of outstanding 
state bonds (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009).
Debt sustainability is a complex phenomenon 
and the detection of accounting tricks requires 
expertise; regardless of the institutions in charge 
of enforcing them, golden rules require the public 
sphere to boost its economic analysis capability. The 
need for technical expertise and the prevention of 
manipulations calls for the creation of independent 
fi scal councils endowed with professional bodies.26 
These independent bodies must include not only 
economists, but also members (coming from the 
ministry of fi nance/budget or the general accounting 
office) with expertise on all the gimmicks that 
are employed to conceal defi cits and debt. Their 
composition, independence and processes could be 
audited by the IMF, as suggested by Rogoff (2011).
Enforcing fi scal discipline is also complex: in practice 
independent fiscal councils issue reports and 
forecasts; their forecast may need to be used by 
governments when preparing their budget. They 
may have a broader remit than issuing independent 
forecasts; for instance, the Swedish fi scal council 
looks at the consequences of government policies. 
But fiscal councils do not enforce compliance. 
Constitutional courts, such as the one in Karlsruhe for 
Germany, do.27 But these courts’ economic expertise 
must be beefed up.
A fi scal rule is only one element of a set of good 
practices for fi scal policy. John Hassler argues28 that 
the Swedish success in the matter (spending ceilings 
have been respected) owes not only to a successful 
Fiscal Policy Council with a broad remit and a 
fi scal rule specifying a 1% surplus target over the 
business cycle,29 but also to complementary features: 
a top-down approach to budget planning (starting 
with decisions on aggregate spending and income, 
and disaggregating), three-year decisions on spending 
ceilings, prespecifi ed budget buffer for unexpected 
expenses, and balanced budget requirement on local 
governments.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BALANCED BUDGET RULES
Another key factor for the success of golden rules is 
a political and popular support for budget discipline. 
Countries such as Sweden, Germany or Chile benefi t 
from a broad consensus in the matter and reforms 
have by and large been bi-partisan.30 A serious concern 
in countries like France and some other countries 
in Southern Europe is that golden rules are the 
objects of maneuvering and clashes within a political 
establishment rather unkeen to see its prerogatives 
reduced. This absence of bi-partisanship, together 
with the recent concerns about the United States 
(driven mainly by a political inaptitude to come to 
terms with budget realities), serves as a reminder that 
institutions cannot deliver optimal outcomes if they 
do not gather a minimum level of political consensus.
The history of the United States provides an interesting 
case study for the development of balanced-budget 
rules (see for example Henning-Kessler 2012 for an 
excellent discussion). Following the Revolutionary 
war and under Treasury secretary Hamilton, the 
26 In Council Directive 2011/85/EU (8 November 2011) on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, it is also envisioned that Member States 
compare their forecasts with those of the Commission and of independent bodies; and that fi scal rules be equipped with well-specifi ed targets together with effective 
monitoring by independent bodies (or at least bodies that are of the fi scal authorities of the Member State). According to the Commission proposal of 23/11/2011 
(currently under discussion in Council and Parliament), euro area Member States would be required to have in place independent fi scal councils and to base 
their budgets on independent forecasts.
27 In the United States, balanced budget rules are better enforced when the state’s Supreme Court judges are elected rather than nominated by the governor and 
confi rmed by the legislature (Bohn-Inman 1996).
28 Presentation at the Banque de France-Toulouse School of Economics conference held at the Banque de France on December 19, 2011.
29 By contrast, no budget in France was balanced since 1974!
30 There has been some recent bickering in Sweden, but amusingly it was the opposition that proposed a bit more stimulus.
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Federal Government assumed all state debts in 1790. 
Federal bailouts became the norm until the 1840s. 
Congress then rejected assumption petitions by 
bankrupt states (this was facilitated by the facts 
that fi nancially sound states were a majority, that 
the economy was less dependent than earlier on 
foreign capital, and that the United States had little 
stake in state bonds). During the 1840s and 1850s 
the states voluntarily adopted budget-balance rules. 
The complete absence of bailout of states by the 
Federal Government has been the norm since, 
despite the fact that regularly some states got into 
fi scal trouble; the one exception is the bailout of 
District of Columbia in the 1990s, and this bailout 
involved Congress managing the state’s budget for 
4 years. Similarly, municipalities and counties have 
not been able to benefi t from bailouts by higher 
authorities; there has been a single instance of state 
bailout of a municipality in the entire US history.
The Federal Government in the United States plays 
an important stabilising role through automatic 
stabilisers and countercyclical policies. Furthermore, 
discretionary policies, such as the 2009 stimulus 
package, are often directed toward covering shortfalls 
of revenues at the state level (up to 75% of the 
stimulus package was used to fi nance state defi cits 
rather than fund new projects).31 Nonetheless, states 
are fully accountable for their debts.
These observations raise the question of whether 
the euro area should mandate the adoption of 
balanced-budget rules. Obviously, the credibility of 
such rules would be much enhanced if the euro area 
countries appropriated these rules (ownership). Yet, the 
spontaneous adoption of rules in the United States in 
the mid-19th century followed a strict no-bailout policy, 
which in Europe would probably prove very costly.
2| BANKING REFORMS
In the wake of the 2008 fi nancial crisis, there is a 
widespread recognition that prudential regulation and 
supervision require a substantial revision. This is not 
the place to discuss reforms that were or likely will be 
put in place.32 But some of these reforms interact with 
institutions that might emerge from the euro crisis, 
and so I should at least touch on the issues. 
With some caveats, I feel that banking reforms on 
the whole go in the right direction: enhanced capital 
requirements (in the medium term, to avoid running 
the risk of a massive credit crunch in the midst 
of a recession); introduction of a countercyclical 
buffer33 and of stricter liquidity requirements (while 
recognising our yet limited knowledge as to how to 
properly measure the cycle and the notion of liquidity); 
stricter rules on pay (in Europe, the United States has 
still some way to go); increased attention to systemic 
factors; better risk measurement.34
I have more reservations concerning opposition to 
the use of ratings for regulatory purposes (as the 
Dodd-Franck Act suggests). To be certain, one could 
regulate rating agencies more tightly whenever their 
ratings are used by the offi cial sector for prudential 
purposes or to determine the quality of collateral 
accepted by central banks. One might also reduce 
the sensitivity of capital requirements to the ratings. 
But shooting the messenger could prove a grave 
mistake. First, arguments against ratings usually focus 
on their shortcomings, without pondering about the 
alternative. In the absence of ratings, rumors and privy 
information in the markets would take center stage. 
Second and especially, it is not clear how offi cials 
in government and central banks would assess 
31 See Henning-Kessler (2012) for more details.
32 There are many articles and surveys about the causes of the recent crisis and their implications for policy reforms. My own views can be found in Dewatripont 
et al. (2010).
33 See also Bolton-Samama (2010) for a proposal involving contingent bonds. By contrast, Bolton et al. (2011) look at the cyclical implications of using ratings as a 
prudential tool.
34 Improving risk measurement has always been a concern since the introduction of risk weights in Basel I regulations in 1988. Some Basel II reforms were unfortunate. 
For instance the risk weight on mortgages was reduced from 50% to 35%; that on the trading book was widely acknowledged to be too lenient; etc…The new 
regulations have corrected some of these mistakes. Still there is a widespread feeling that proper risk weights are hard to design. Because of this, regulators have 
introduced a non-risk-based additional constraint, the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio, though, is a very poor statistic for the riskiness of a bank.
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the riskiness of fi nancial institutions and assets. 
One alternative approach would consist in using 
internal assessments made by regulators and central 
banks. This approach might be most appealing in the 
case of sovereign bonds, for which it is often argued 
that rating agencies have no specifi c information 
(by contrast with corporate bonds). On the other 
hand, this gives much discretion to regulators, who 
may use their assessment to exert forbearance. 
Another alternative to ratings in prudential 
supervision is the use of internal risk based (IRB) 
models for qualifi ed banks. While these models 
are monitored by supervisors, they leave much 
discretion to the institutions and would leave even 
more discretion in the absence of ratings. Regulators 
have substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis rating 
agencies, which derive much profi t from their role as 
auxiliaries of prudential regulation; and even though 
regulating credit rating agencies is no easy task 
(e.g., Coffee 2007), regulators can use their leverage 
to have some control over process and deontological 
rules adopted by the rating agencies.
I also have mixed feelings concerning the tax on 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI).35 
I am concerned that supervisors, who are already 
struggling to keep up with the traditional regulated 
sphere (commercial banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds) will lack the staff to monitor a much 
broader fi nancial sector. The ease with which fi nancial 
activities can migrate toward new players (energy 
companies for instance) and the diffi culty in measuring 
who is “systemically important” (would LTCM or AIG 
have been deemed to be systemically important?) are 
causes for concern. An alternative is to protect the 
regulated sphere against defaults of non-regulated 
players. In this respect, the proposals on the use of 
clearinghouses (to assess and contain systemic risk) 
and of standardised products (to be able to measure 
clearinghouse solvency and thereby prevent them 
from reaching a stage in which they would invariably 
be deemed too big to fail) seem well-taken.
Returning to a point made in the introduction, another 
area where risk measurement needs to be improved 
is sovereign risk. The European Banking Authority in 
October 2011 recommended the use of a temporary 
capital buffer by European banks, so as to refl ect 
current market prices.36 At the BIS, Hannoun (2011) 
argued in favor of removing the risk-free sovereign tag. 
According to a recent IMF study,37 European banks 
had EUR 339 billion exposure to GIIPS.38 Not all was 
measured at market value: sovereign holdings by 
European banks decompose into 12% in the trading 
book (fair value), 49% available for sale (fair value; 
unrealised losses reduce equity, not profi t), and 39% 
held to maturity (no recognition of losses).
Banking regulators have traditionally been generous 
with the assessment of sovereign risk, considering 
since Basel I that OECD countries could not default. 
Under current Basel rules, risk weights for sovereign 
debt rated AAA to AA– are still 0% (furthermore, 
Europe uses 0-risk weight for euro area countries 
for the purpose of stress tests.39 The United States 
continues to apply 0 risk-weights to OECD countries). 
The low capital requirement, together with a new 
demand for “liquid” assets to satisfy the liquidity 
coverage ratio, creates a strong incentive for banks 
to hold sovereign debt.
Finally, effi cient cross border resolution mechanisms 
are widely acknowledged to be a key issue for the 
future of regulation.
3| THE EUROBOND DEBATE
Solidarity among euro area countries has taken 
center stage in the policy discussions about the 
current crisis. Should solidarity take the form of 
Eurobond issues, a stability fund, a mechanism in 
which euro area countries are jointly liable for each 
other’s default, or more informally an ex post bailout 
policy? While these questions make daily headlines, 
35 On October 11, 2011, the US Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) voted to monitor large hedge funds, asset managers, mutual funds, insurance companies, 
and other fi nancial institutions whose failure might jeopardise the fi nancial system. The FSOC’s criteria are: debt level, derivative liabilities, leverage ratio, 
short term debt, CDSs written against the company. By contrast, the Basel Committee proposes the following equal-weighting indicators: size, interconnectedness, 
lack of substitutes for their services, cross-jurisdictional activities, and complexity.
36 Of course, market prices may be socially meaningless if guarantees and bailouts are expected. But from the point of view of banks they are relevant.
37 IMF Global Financial Stability Review, September 2011.
38 Euro area countries are particularly exposed to European risk: for example, foreign claims (cross-border and local claims of affi liates) on the public sector of Italy 
were, according to the same study, EUR 105 billion for France, 51 billion for Germany, 13 billion for the United Kingdom, and 13 billion for the United States.
39 The Capital Requirements Directive in the European Union based on Basel II, in its annex, specifi es that exposures to Member States’ sovereign debt and to the 
ECB receive a risk weight of 0%.
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few elements of analysis are available. The purpose 
of this section is to shed some light on the relevant 
considerations. 
3|1 Allocation of risk between 
the sovereign and its creditors
To put the proposals in perspective, it may be useful 
to remind ourselves of some economics of sovereign 
borrowing. This section focuses on the allocation of 
risk between the borrowing country and its foreign 
creditors, which has been the focus of the economic 
literature.
LIQUIDITY VS. SOLVENCY
Economists distinguish between liquidity and 
solvency problems. A solvency problem arises when 
the primary defi cit and competitiveness problems 
make the path of sovereign debt unsustainable. 
A “pure liquidity problem” (à la Calvo 1988) arises 
when a country is actually on a sustainable path, but 
self-fulfi lling realisations force it to pay very high 
interest rates, making its debt grow fast (especially 
if the sovereign debt has a short maturity) and in 
the end making it indeed diffi cult to reimburse the 
debt. The liquidity view of sovereign crises thus 
emphasises self-fulfi lling realisations of insolvency; 
the country’s fundamentals are such that the debt 
could be sustainable, and indeed there is another 
market equilibrium in which the country maintains 
an easy access to the international debt market.
Whether a country is suffering from a liquidity crisis 
or from a solvency problem is often hard to tell; both 
lead to high interest rates and ultimately a lack of 
access to international capital markets. My hunch 
is that both are at work in Europe today, except for 
Greece whose insolvency under the laissez-faire path 
was transparent. 
Unfortunately, desirable policies depend radically on 
the diagnostic. Illiquidity problems call for widespread 
guarantees against country default, while insolvency 
problems require interference with country policies 
and acceptance of a potential default.
INSURANCE/MORAL HAZARD TRADEOFF
Countries understandably want to be insured against 
adverse shocks; on the other hand, insurance reduces 
accountability and countries can avail themselves of 
many ways to “expropriate” foreign investors: through 
default, devaluation, or extractive activities (taxation, 
straight asset expropriation). Policies leading to such 
expropriations fall into two groups:40
• policies leading to a lack of competitiveness: 
labor laws, investments in non-tradable – real estate 
typically – rather than competitiveness-enhancing 
investments, protection of specifi c professions…; 
• policies leading to public debt concerns: high 
public spending and low taxes – or insuffi cient tax 
collection efforts –, lax banking supervision, failure 
to reform the pension system...
High costs of devaluation or default counter the 
insuffi cient internalisation of foreign investors’ 
welfare and create a commitment to repay foreign 
investors. This may explain why untrusted countries 
often exhibit the “original sin”: emerging countries’ 
(public and private) liabilities to foreign investors 
are often debt liabilities, which are short-term 
and denominated in foreign currency (the dollar, 
say). Original sin liabilities limit foreign investors’ 
exposure to country moral hazard by making their 
claim less sensitive to bad country policy; but they 
expose the country to more risk.41
Symptoms of concern about such moral hazard are 
many. As we just saw, countries that are not trusted 
must issue debt that is short-term and denominated 
in a foreign currency. To assess whether a country 
is trustworthy, foreign investors scrutinise not only 
economic fundamentals, but also domestic political 
economy features. They thereby try to understand 
whether policies that protect investment are likely to 
be implemented; for example, such policies are more 
likely to be adopted, the more evenly distributed 
40 The discrepancy in behaviour before and after accession to the euro area is an illustration of potential moral hazard in our context.
41 An interesting issue is whether unregulated market lending to the country’s private sector is optimal. In a pure moral hazard context, the answer is no; the country 
actually ends up being exposed to too little risk; for, private lender-borrower relationship do not internalise the disciplining effect on the government of risky 
forms of liabilities and therefore their impact on other lender-borrower relationships (Tirole, 2003). Two arguments operating in the other direction – excessively 
risky equilibrium borrowing – will be given shortly.
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security ownership is in the domestic population 
(say, because pensions are funded rather than 
pay-as-you-go). Similarly, it is understood that a home 
bias in portfolio investment, despite substantial costs 
in lack of diversifi cation, makes it more likely that 
investor-friendly policies be adopted. Yet another 
symptom of the existence of moral hazard is the 
routine use by the IMF of stage fi nancing (i.e. making 
tranches contingent on progress made) when 
implementing a restructuring of a country’s debt.
Concerns over moral hazard also loom large in 
the legal debate on sovereign debt restructuring. 
Sovereign debt contracts often are written under 
New York law (the most common relevant law for 
sovereign borrowing), and include clauses such as 
the unanimity rule and the pari passu clause. It is 
well-known that such clauses favor holdouts and 
thereby create diffi culties for restructuring debt;42 
and so there have been widespread calls for including 
collective action clauses (CACs), which incidentally 
will be the case in the euro area starting in 2013.43 
There has been much debate among economists 
and among lawyers as to whether collective actions 
clauses are desirable; for, while they defi nitely 
improve the countries’ ability to restructure when in 
trouble, they do not come for free: lenders’ protection 
is reduced and the higher likelihood that they will 
have to incur losses makes them less eager to lend 
in the fi rst place. So CACs, while offering undeniable 
benefi ts, should not be viewed as a panacea.
Bolton and Skeel (2004) argue that short-run political 
incentives introduce a bias toward hard-to-restructure 
sovereign borrowing. Borrowing with high 
restructuring costs bring a short-term benefit 
– borrowing at a cheaper rate – at the cost of a delayed 
and uncertain costlier default if the country gets 
into trouble.44
ADVERSE SELECTION AND STIGMA 
Signaling provides another reason why countries 
may choose to make default excessively costly. 
Interestingly, the same features that make countries 
more accountable for their misbehaviour (debt that 
has short maturity and is denominated in foreign 
currency) can be also explained by posturing/signaling 
concerns. To avoid stigma, countries may bend over 
backwards to demonstrate that they are confi dent 
that they will not encounter debt problems (so may 
do multilateral institutions or central banks, as was 
the case when Greece was deemed able to repay 
its debts). To this purpose, they take on dangerous 
forms of debt. Thus while dangerous forms of debt 
are vindicated by moral hazard problems, excessive 
dangerosity can also be observed due to adverse 
selection. 
More generally signaling concerns are ubiquitous 
in foreign borrowing. They explain for instance the 
unfortunate experience with what a priori was a 
good idea: IMF’s contingent credit lines (CCL), which 
gave countries an automatic access to a credit line 
support and thereby reduced the risk of illiquidity. 
CCLs were never used.
RENEGOTIATION AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
Commitment is not easily achieved in the international 
fi nance realm. In fact, debt contracts are routinely 
restructured in ways that were not planned ahead. 
This is understandable: private creditors prefer to 
cut their losses and strike a deal than confront the 
possibility of a full-fl edged default. Commitment is 
also hard to achieve when creditors are (directly, or 
indirectly through exposures of their banking system 
to the troubled country) sovereigns themselves. As is 
well-known, the EU treaty had ruled out bailouts, but 
Europe reneged on this commitment.
42 A well-known case in point is Argentina, which defaulted in 2001 on sovereign debt without collective action clauses. Argentina succeeded over the years in getting 
93% of bondholders on board for an offer reimbursing 35 cents on the dollar (a low offer by historical standards). At the date of this writing, holdouts still create 
diffi culties for Argentina to return to international capital markets (for an account, see “Gauchos and Gadfl ies”, The Economist, October 22, 2011, pp. 82-83).
43 Under a collective action clause, a supermajority of bondholders (often 75%) can agree on a debt restructuring with the Sovereign. That agreement is then legally 
binding on all other holders of the bond. Collective action clauses will be introduced for new bond issues starting in 2013. Collective action clauses much facilitate 
the restructuring of sovereign debt ex post, but they also make it harder to issue debt ex ante. De Grauwe (2011a) notes that euro area bond spreads went up when 
Germany proposed to introduce such clauses in October 2010. Already about ten years ago the IMF proposed to introduce an automatic stay mechanism, the 
“Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM), in which a debtor-creditors negotiation was meant to lead to an agreement that would come into existence 
if voted by a supermajority in each class.
44 Bolton and Skeel move on to argue in favor of the use of fi rst-in-time absolute priority rule in SDRMs (as a baseline). 
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3|2 Allocation of country risk 
between the market 
and the international community
While a rich literature analyses the sharing of risk 
between a sovereign borrower and its creditors, 
much less is known concerning the optimal 
allocation of risk among creditors: offi cial sector 
vs. private investors; and among countries within 
the offi cial sector.45
Who, of markets and governments, should bear the 
burden of default? In the current context, who foots 
the bill also determines who monitors. If markets 
are to monitor countries by removing their access 
to fi nancing when bad policies are selected, then the 
private sector should be made accountable: banks 
should bear the burden for losses they incur when 
lending to the country; and prudential regulation 
should treat risky sovereign debt as a risky asset 
when computing capital adequacy requirements. 
If the offi cial sector is in charge of controlling debt 
sustainability, then it should foot the bill and also 
intervene whenever a country’s indebtedness path 
may not be sustainable. As we noted above, none of 
these alternatives prevailed in the euro area crisis.
As for the allocation of risk within the offi cial sector, 
it is generally assumed in the European context that 
other euro area countries are the natural providers 
of insurance. This assumption, which is refl ected 
in negotiations and current bailout policies, is at 
fi rst sight startling. After all, insurance economics 
points at the desirability of spreading risk broadly, 
and not allocating it to a small group, which moreover 
may well face correlated shocks. Indeed, alternative 
cross-insurance mechanisms (taking the form of 
liquidity provision to countries) already exist, that 
do not involve insurance among countries within 
a monetary zone. We already noted that the IMF 
introduced in 1999 the CCL (replaced in 2009 by 
the Flexible Credit Line, with qualifi cation criteria, 
but no pre-disbursement conditionality).The Chiang 
Mai Initiative, launched in 2010, is a multilateral 
currency swap arrangement pooling USD 120 billion. 
It encompasses the ten members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea. Crucially, 
this scheme involves insurance among countries with 
different currencies, unlike the euro area scheme.
This raises the question of comparative advantage 
in the provision of offi cial sector insurance to a 
sovereign. Insurance can be non-contracted-for/ 
spontaneous/ex post, as in the case of a bailout, 
or contractual, as in the case of joint-and-several 
liability. Bailouts are driven by the fear that spillovers 
from the distressed country’s default negatively affect 
the rescuer. In this sense, countries that are deeply 
intertwined within a monetary zone may be more 
natural providers of insurance than less connected 
countries. Collateral damages of a country’s default 
are de facto collateral for the country. 
Joint-and-several liability mobilises further collateral. 
In effect, a country’s default becomes its guarantor’s 
default if the latter fails to abide by its obligation to 
stand by the defaulting country. So the guarantor’s 
incentive to pay is larger than in the absence of 
joint liability. But joint liability also makes domino 
dynamics more likely.
3|3 Mixing solidarity and market discipline
INTRODUCTION
Starting with a proposal by Delpla and von Weizsacker, 
three proposals mixing solidarity with a market 
mechanism have attracted wide attention in policy 
circles:
• “Blue bonds/red bonds” (Delpla-von Weizsacker, 2010)
• “Eurobills” (Hellwig-Philippon, 2011)
• “European safe bonds” (Euro-nomics group, 2011).
A fi rst caveat: my understanding of the implications 
of these three innovative proposals is still very 
imperfect, and so the following notes are to be 
taken with a grain of salt and are only meant to 
stimulate further thinking on them. Furthermore, 
formal analyses will in the future substantially clarify 
their properties. 
Second, despite the prominence of these three 
academic proposals, we should note the existence 
45 The offi cial sector comprises governments and their agencies, central banks, government controlled institutions and international institutions. For the purpose 
of an economic analysis, banks that are likely to be bailed out by their government can also be considered as part of the offi cial sector.
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of related institutional suggestions. For instance, 
the German Council of Economic Experts, in its 
November 2011 report, argues for a “European 
redemption pact” in which national debt caps are 
binding and joint-and-several liability applies to 60% 
of country GDP and countries pledge collateral: 20% 
of loans in currency reserves, and earmarking of 
national tax revenue to further guarantee repayment. 
In a Green Paper, the European Commission (2011) 
discusses various options for “Stability Bonds”, 
which would be jointly issued by Member States 
and accompanied by a substantially reinforced 
fi scal surveillance; these bonds’ guarantee structure 
could range from the absence of joint liability (each 
Member State is liable for its share of liabilities) to 
joint-and-several liability (Members are liable not 
only for their own share, but also for the others’ 
share in case the latter default), with an intermediate 
arrangement consisting of an absence of joint liability 
but some seniority and collateral enhancement 
(seniority status for Stability Bonds, partial collateral 
in gold or other assets, earmarking of specific 
revenues). Finally, there have also been multiple 
proposals made by leading European politicians.46
The Euro-nomics group proposal (ESBies) on the 
one hand and the Delpla-von Weizsacker and 
Hellwig-Philippon proposals (joint-and-several 
liability) on the other hand offer different forms of 
solidarity. To some extent the distinction can be seen 
as one between “ex ante solidarity” (the pooling of 
interest-rate conditions among countries) and “ex post 
solidarity” (the obligation for healthy countries to 
stand by and foot the bill for a fraction of troubled 
countries’ debt). The Euro-nomics group requires 
no joint-and-several liability while the other two do. 
As I earlier argued, the purpose of joint-and-several 
liability is to increase the size of a guarantor country’s 
credible pledge: if the country does not honor its 
guarantee, it itself defaults and therefore incurs 
a cost that is much larger than just the spillover 
externality of the other country’s default. Put 
differently, joint-and-several liability leads to higher 
refi nancing capability, but also to more contagion. 
JOINT-AND SEVERAL-LIABILITY PROPOSALS 
First, we consider the joint-liability proposals 
(Delpla-von Weizsacker, Hellwig-Philippon). 
The Delpla-von Weizsacker blue bonds-red bonds 
proposal goes as follows:
“Euro-area countries should divide their sovereign debt 
into two parts. The fi rst part, up to 60 percent of GDP, 
should be pooled as ‘blue’ bonds with senior status, to 
be jointly and severally guaranteed by participating 
countries. All debt beyond that should be issued as 
purely national ‘red’ bonds with junior status…The 
blue debt is the senior tranche (repaid before any other 
public debt – excepting only the IMF which enjoys 
super seniority) of the sovereign debt of the euro area 
participating countries…The annual allocation of 
blue bonds would be proposed by an independent 
stability council staffed by members who would enjoy 
a similar degree of professional independence to the 
board members of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
This allocation would then be voted on by the national 
parliaments of participating countries, having the 
ultimate budgetary authority required to issue the blue 
bond mutual guarantees. Any country voting against 
the pro-posed allocation would thereby decide neither 
to issue any blue bonds in the coming year nor to 
guarantee any blue bonds of that particular vintage.”
Hellwig and Philippon propose that the safe debt 
be Eurobills (common debt with maturity under 
a year); Eurobills would enjoy joint-and-several 
liability, just like the blue bonds described above. 
No country could have more than 10% of its GDP in 
Eurobills outstanding at any point of time. Benefi ting 
from Eurobills issues would be conditional on sound 
long-term fiscal policy. Importantly, countries 
would not be able to issue short-term debt of their 
own. Eurobills would also benefi t from a special 
prudential treatment in that they would be the 
favored asset for European banks to satisfy their 
Basel III liquidity ratios. Finally, all countries are 
meant to participate in the programme, so as to 
avoid stigma and unraveling.
46 One of the most famous proposals, the Tremonti-Juncker proposal, was made by the then fi nance minister of Italy and prime minister of Luxembourg in a 
Financial Times article (December 5, 2010). This proposal, which allowed countries to issue up to 40% of their debt in the form of Eurobonds and up to 100% 
in harsh times, was promptly rejected by France and Germany.
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Common features
Because the two proposals went through similar lines 
of economic reasoning as above, they share a number 
of features:47
• None proposes an (unrealistic) full-fl edged fi scal 
integration.
• Building on the observation that the implicit 
solidarity that prevailed over the last ten years led 
to disaster,48 none of the proposals argues in favor of 
an extended solidarity.49 Rather, both create (at least) 
two classes of debt: a safe senior tranche (respectively, 
blue bonds, Eurobills) and a risky junior tranche 
(respectively, red bonds, long-term claims). Both 
recognise the existence of both moral hazard and 
stigma avoidance strategies. They address the stigma 
problem through automaticity/ comprehensiveness. 
To mitigate the moral hazard problem, they call for the 
use of complementary policies to limit profl igacy.50 
Relatedly, they acknowledge the existence of both 
a liquidity and a solvency problem, and therefore 
trade off insurance (provided by other sovereigns 
on the senior tranche) and market-based discipline 
(e.g. for borrowing above 60% of GDP).
• Both discuss the benefi t associated with safe bonds’ 
substantial liquidity premium, i.e. the “exorbitant 
privilege” of low interest rates (especially given new 
Basel III liquidity requirements and the concomitant 
high demand for risk-free assets).
• Both insist on reforming banking regulation so as 
to sever the link between banks and sovereigns and 
to reduce the risk of country bailouts motivated by 
the need to rescue banks. The proposals suggest a 
strong differentiation in regulatory weights between 
junior and senior tranches:
– The safe tranche would receive a 0-risk weight 
and be accepted by the ECB in repo operations.
– Delpla and von Weizsacker have the harshest 
prudential treatment of junior tranches: they 
suggest that European banks not be allowed to 
hold red bonds, and the ECB not to be allowed 
to accept them as collateral in repo operations. 
The junior tranche in the two proposals is meant to 
be held by unregulated high-leverage entities such 
as hedge funds. The proposals are right in fearing 
that European banks’ ownership of the junior 
tranche raises concern about Europe’ pledge not 
to implicitly guarantee the reimbursement of that 
tranche. Note though that there is no free lunch 
here: the holding of the junior tranche outside the 
euro area reduces European countries’ incentive 
to impose discipline and to repay that tranche. 
Differences
Besides their shared features, the Delpla-von Weizsacker 
and Hellwig-Philippon joint-and-several liability 
proposals exhibit some differences. While agreeing on 
making the guaranteed debt (blue bonds, Eurobills) 
senior to other debt, they differ in their views as to 
how to make it senior: Delpla and von Weizsacker 
opt for a contractual solution,51 while Hellwig and 
Philippon view short maturities as the only way to 
enforce seniority. 
Hellwig and Philippon argue that guarantees on 
long-term debt encourage “asset substitution”: under 
long-term sovereign debt guarantees, the country has 
particularly low incentives to undertake reforms, 
such as a pension reform, that boost long-term debt 
sustainability. They want the European Union to be 
able to look at long-term market spreads of countries, 
which rules out long-term guarantees. By contrast, 
the rollover of short-term debt allows continuous 
monitoring by the guarantors.
Note that the Delpla-von Weizsacker and 
Hellwig-Philippon proposals’ emphasis on making 
47 This description about what blue bonds and eurobills have in common is applicable to ESBies (which we will later discuss) as well. The Euro-nomics group 
proposal also has a safe senior and a risky junior tranche. It does not propose full integration. It also recognises moral hazard and shares with the other proposals 
a two-pillar strategy to deal with it – market discipline must complement EU level authority. Finally, it also insists on reforming banking regulation.
48 There may also have been a misperception that risk had disappeared. 
49 Recall that we de facto had (the perception of) a full solidarity until Greece defaulted.
50 Or they impose conditionality on a country’s access to senior tranche fi nancing. For example, Delpla-von Weizsacker suggest that a “blue committee” make a 
proposal as to the amount (bounded above by 60% of GDP) of bonds that can be issued as blue bonds; this proposal must then be ratifi ed by all parliaments.
51 That is not an easy thing to do in practice. Establishing a seniority rule for sovereigns might require major legal changes.
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offi cial sector debt senior can be justifi ed by the 
desire to prevent dilution of that debt through 
excessive issuing of other debt in the international 
fi nancial market.52
DISCUSSION 
The proposals consider a limited set of instruments 
and of course cannot by themselves constitute a 
comprehensive policy to re-build a euro area (as they 
willingly acknowledge). Some remaining concerns 
relate to the applicability to the resolution of the 
current crisis, others to steady-state environments.
Short-term/transition
Cross-subsidy concern: Standard liquidity provision/risk 
sharing models presume that accord is reached behind 
veil of ignorance; this hypothesis is not realistic in our 
context and suspicion of a cross-subsidy from Northern to 
Southern Europe may thwart efforts to reach a consensus 
on these proposals.53 This point is important because, 
once the veil of ignorance is lifted, healthy countries 
have no incentive to accept obligations beyond the 
implicit ones that arise from spillover externalities. 
Put differently, it is not in the self-interest of healthy 
countries to accept joint-and-several liability, even 
though they realise that it will be in their interest to 
ex post offer some solidarity in order to prevent spillovers 
of sovereign default; an ex ante transfer from distressed 
countries to healthy ones to compensate them for, and 
make them accept the future liability is ruled out as it 
would just add to the distressed countries’ indebtedness 
and thus the compensation would be in funny money. 
Joint-and-several liability emerges more naturally in 
an environment in which countries are behind the 
veil of ignorance and therefore are not necessarily 
reluctant to take on risky liabilities to create mutual 
insurance. The current reality is that Germany is on 
the hook, and any reform proposal has to address the 
question: what is in it for Germany?
No free lunch: as is recognised by the authors, the 
creation of a safe tranche implies that the leftover 
tranche is riskier than previous debt, implying a 
short-term problem: how would it be rolled over? 
Rolling over sovereign debt is currently diffi cult; 
presumably rollovers would be more diffi cult to 
arrange under the new schemes unless there is a 
default on existing debt or relatedly existing debt 
is, unlike new debt, deemed “restructurable”. The 
Hellwig-Philippon Eurobills proposal suggest a 
substitution of existing short-term debt by the 
Eurobills; in this configuration the priority of 
long-term liabilities remains the same, and their 
spreads might even be reduced a bit if the short-term 
spreads are reduced by the joint liability. On the other 
hand, this substitution strategy limits the feasible 
scope of the Eurobills programmes.
Legal aspects: both proposals fi nd a way around 
standard clauses of treating creditors equally. The 
senior tranche–junior tranche feature implements 
the possibility of a selective default. Such a feature 
might face a risk of litigation whenever existing 
sovereign debt contracts include a pari passu clause 
or other provisions promising equal treatment of 
creditors. To be sure, European countries are quite 
different from emerging countries in that a sizeable 
fraction of their debt is issued under local law, and 
so selective default is easier. Nonetheless, this is a 
concern for the fraction of the debt issued under 
foreign law. And this may become an even bigger 
concern in the future if European countries other 
than Greece default, making it more diffi cult for 
sovereign debt to be issued under local law. 
Steady state
Soft budget constraint: both proposals assume 
that the need to issue the junior tranche at 
market-determined terms will discipline countries, 
and that a no-bail-out clause will ensure that 
that tranche will not be rescued. However, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
not meant to exist, and the ECB was not meant to 
purchase the debt of troubled European countries. 
One argument for why this would change is that 
European banks would be prohibited from holding 
the risky part, making it less attractive for other 
European countries to bail out a distressed country 
52 IMF credits routinely enjoy seniority. There is some debate as to whether the ESFS credits should similarly benefi t from seniority. The fi rst Greek rescue package 
in early 2010 had only IMF seniority; the ESFS was on pari passu terms with other claims. Gros (2010) criticises the later change in policy making European 
rescue funding senior to private debt (but subordinated to IMF lending) on the ground that this might reduce the willingness of the private sector to continue 
fi nancing distressed countries; he argues that short-term debt should be rescheduled; fi nally he discusses the likelihood that ECB could ex post negotiate a seniority 
privilege for its very sizeable holdings of sovereign debt.
53 The following discussion draws from Tirole (2012).
FSR16.indb   238 06/04/2012   11:36:17
Public debt, monetary policy and fi nancial stability
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 16 • April 2012 239
The euro crisis: some refl exions on institutional reform
Jean Tirole
(see, e.g., the discussion in Delpla-von Weizsacker). 
Also, to create better incentives, the Hellwig-Philippon 
and Delpla-von Weizsacker proposals create 
possibilities for exit, for instance through votes in 
parliaments and the payment of a fee for exiting 
(Hellwig-Philippon). For example the Finnish 
Parliament could decide that countries are not doing 
enough and quit. This would introduce market-like 
discipline at the expense of some solidarity/stability.
Domino effects and non-monitoring of buffer: the 
Delpla-von Weizsacker and Hellwig-Philippon 
schemes rely on ex post solidarity. The perception 
of a possible joint-and-several liability today starts 
raising concerns about the quality of even German 
bonds. Making this offi cial policy might accelerate this 
process. Furthermore, joint-and-several liability, like 
average-cost-pricing, raises the spectrum of snowball 
effects associated with a shrinking tax base. As more 
countries default, each country is more tempted either 
to default, or to exit the scheme, in effect destroying it. 
Relatedly, the schemes are designed mainly from the 
perspective of profl igate countries, offering them a 
mix of insurance and accountability. But countries 
that are not in trouble may be called to insure large 
amounts of sovereign debts if either a large country 
or multiple countries in the euro area simultaneously 
are in trouble. An analogy with large payment 
systems may be useful here. Such systems when 
they allow for mutual credit lines require collateral 
in an amount suffi cient not to create perturbations 
in the payment system if one bank fails.54 Multiple 
bank failures by contrast are meant to be covered by 
a lender of last resort. 
Returning to the euro area, by focusing on bad pupils, 
the proposals do not address the possibility that even 
Germany may not prepare itself adequately to its 
role as insurer. Somehow, either Germany needs to 
be monitored and become “super solvent”, or some 
second defense that involves non euro area parties 
must be planned: substantial credit line from the IMF 
or (with all associated hazards) ECB-led devaluation.
3|4 The sovereign debt repackaging proposal
Finally, consider the ESBies (Euro-nomics Group 
proposal) which is rather different from the other 
two. It works as follows:55
“A European debt agency would buy on the secondary 
market approximately 5.5 trillion euros of sovereign 
debt (60% of the euro area’s GDP). The weight of each 
country’s debt would be equal to its contribution to the 
euro area’s GDP. Hence, each marginal euro of sovereign 
debt beyond 60% of GDP would have to be traded on 
a single bond market, where prices would refl ect true 
sovereign risk, sending the right signal to the country’s 
government. To fi nance its 5.5 trillion purchases, the 
debt agency would issue two securities. The fi rst security, 
the ESBies, would be senior on interest and principal 
repayments of bonds held by the agency. The second 
security would receive the rest – it is therefore riskier 
and would take the hit if one or more sovereigns default. 
European banking regulation and ECB policy would be 
adjusted so that banks face incentives to invest in safe 
ESBies instead of risky sovereign debt… Because they 
are a pure repackaging of existing debt, [ESBies] do not 
require additional funding by member states. They do 
not involve joint liability; if one member-state defaults, 
the junior tranche will take the hit.”
Note that there is no joint issuing and that there is no 
need to change existing treaties. To boost the demand 
for ESBies, the Euro-nomics group proposes that 
ESBies be treated as fully safe for bank regulation and 
ECB haircuts. By contrast, national bonds’ treatment 
would now be based on ratings: national bonds rated 
AAA would still be treated as perfectly safe; but as 
a rule, national bonds would no longer be deemed 
risk-free. This would incentivise euro area banks to 
hold mainly ESBies rather than risky national bonds. 
To create the ESBies, a “European Debt Agency” or 
EDA would buy national debts at secondary market 
prices and repackage them. The Euro-nomics group 
argues that the private sector could not as effi ciently 
achieve the repackaging by bundling the debt of 
54 See Rochet-Tirole (1996b) for a description of the CHIPS system and related ones.
55 Vox-EU, “ESBies: A realistic reform of Europe’s fi nancial architecture”.
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multiple countries: the idea is that the private sector 
would have diffi culty achieving the scale and degree 
of standardisation that the EDA could achieve. 
It might further fail to achieve standardisation of 
ESBies issues over time and produce regular issues of 
ESBies and junior bonds with the same composition 
for different maturities.
A key objective of ESBies is thus to allow Italy and 
Spain to earn part of the safety premium from a safe 
asset denominated in Euros – and that premium is 
high in the current crisis. The value-adding aspect of 
ESBies is the creation of a liquid asset in large supply 
and high degree of standardisation. The group further 
proposes to strengthen the ESBies (but not the junior 
bond) using a limited credit enhancement in the 
form of paid-in capital to the EDA by the European 
governments. This would spread any residual default 
risk equally across ESBies cohorts, homogenising 
them further and increasing their liquidity. While 
the credit enhancement would be used with low 
probability, its size would be too large for any private 
securitising entity to offer. The credit enhancement 
would not apply to the junior bond. 
4| CONCLUDING NOTES
This paper’s objective was to identify long-term 
institutions that could restore the sustainability of 
the euro area. Because we do not stand behind the 
veil of ignorance, and cultures and institutions are 
not shared, the prospect of sizeable, well-identifi able 
cross-subsidies hampers solidarity among countries. 
For this reason, and also because of moral hazard 
concerns, fi scal integration or full-fl edged Eurobonds 
are not really on the agenda. Short of these, countries 
must draw the lessons of the failures of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Countries must accept some loss 
of sovereignty in two respects: they must devolve 
powers to independent fi scal councils, and when 
push comes to shove, they must accommodate 
further interference in the management of their 
economy. More discipline in turn increases the scope 
for solidarity. 
While we are moving toward more effective balanced 
budget requirements, much work is still required to 
make them work. A weakness of golden rules is that 
they very imperfectly capture a country’s efforts to 
build its long-term competitiveness. Cleaning up 
over-indebted countries’ debt and controlling fi scal 
defi cits is insuffi cient if the countries continue 
suffering steady balance of payments diffi culties. 
Economic research should pay much more attention 
than it currently does to a proper accounting of 
sovereign debt sustainability. 
Formally, we have not discussed the potential role of 
the central bank in indirectly monetising sovereign 
debts. A breakthrough of the last decades has been the 
successful fi ght against infl ation; a return to infl ation, 
even temporary, would be a setback. This comeback 
of infl ation will however become unavoidable if the 
sovereign crisis spreads to large European countries; 
put differently, the ECB will have to stand by as 
lender of last resort on an even larger scale than 
today. Hopefully the required institutional reforms 
will occur suffi ciently soon to reestablish trust in 
Europe and thwart such a contagious spiral, and 
if they are insuffi cient to prevent such an adverse 
development, to ensure that infl ating will be a 
“once in a lifetime event”.
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